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Abstract
The relationship between the media and the government of any country is mostly interconnected
and has progressed from what it used to be several years ago. Typically, political leaders use media
to communicate the promised benefits of their policies to the public, in addition to other intentions.
The public consequently receives information about foreign policy updates from the news media
which forms their opinions with respect to foreign policy. In the occurrence of war initiatives
abroad, the president’s actions represent all of America’s, implying, albeit indirectly, that the
president’s military initiatives abroad must be largely supported domestically. This literature
reviews scholarships that argue for a strong relationship between public opinion and a president’s
foreign policy choices in a democratic military decision making. This paper also explains that news
media plays a conveying, yet strategic role in informing public opinion enough to potentially
influence foreign policy decisions.
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The fainting line between domestic and foreign affairs makes it expected that people would
now largely hold strong views about foreign policy rather than previous indifference. This
is because issues such as migration, human rights violation, climate change, and free trade, now
also have a direct impact on job prospects, air quality in neighborhoods, etc. It should
therefore appear that these changes would imply that masses now expect that governments should
(and will) take their opinions earnestly, including on foreign policy1. But these expectations of the
government do not go without skepticism. For example, in the past twelve months, trust in
governments has sharply declined2, and in any democracy, this decline in public support should
be a source of concern. Currently, there is a growing body of research on the relationship between
foreign policy [process and outcome] and public opinion. Typically, political leaders use media to
communicate the promised benefits of their policy proposals to the public and to convey the
perceived drawbacks of their political enemies’ proposals. However, in the occurrence of
military initiatives abroad, the president’s actions represent all of America’s; making the case for
a relationship between public support and a president’s foreign policy choices, and more so, how
the public perceives these decisions through the media. This breathes a set of questions: is the
news media an accurate source of information about American foreign affairs? More so, can
public opinion be trusted as coming from highly informed considerations? If yes, why should these
opinions be integrated into strategic decisions in foreign policy? This study reviews the literature
on the relationship between public opinion and foreign policy and how news media affects that
relationship. This literature also reviews foreign policy attitudes as an indicator for the mass
public’s foreign policy preferences, and moderately addresses the possibility of bias in the way
news media conveys the intentions of policymakers in the way the policymakers expect. This
study does not attempt to explain foreign policy outcomes but instead seeks to explore multifaceted
relationships between the actors in public opinion and foreign policy outcomes.
Components of the Foreign Policy Marketplace
In the foreign policy arena of a democracy, citizens and news media are two equally
important and indispensable actors. This literature consistently discusses the interdependent
relationship of these actors alongside a third actor: elites/leaders.
Citizens: The word ‘citizens’ is also commonly used interchangeably as masses, the people, or the
public. In the early works of Kant, Rousseau, Mill, and more recently in studies on democratic
peace, and from contemporary democratic theorists,3 citizen engagement is considered as
important to peaceful and thorough foreign policymaking process. Consequently, the
government’s responsiveness to the public is depicted as a cornerstone of democratic
governance.4 In contrast, federalists like James Madison and Alexander Hamilton were wary of
the impact of public’s opinion on constructive political decision making, particularly in foreign
policy. Whether or not the public’s engagement is or should be relevant to foreign policy
discussions, there is a mutual denominator among both sides which entails that the public is an
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important factor in foreign policy. In (Page and Boutton 2006)5, they corroborated this hypothesis
by characterizing public opinion as a “relatively stable and consistent counterweight” that policy
makers must, or at least should, take into consideration. Nevertheless, there has not been a
consistent and uniform literature review of the citizens’ actual role in the foreign policymaking
process of a democratic country.
Media: For the purposes of this study, media (news media and mass media) is considered a critical
actor and player alongside elites and citizens in shaping public behaviors about, and influence on,
foreign policy.
Elites/leaders: In the discussion on foreign policy in political communication, elites are often
described and used interchangeably as the political leaders such as the president, the president’s
cabinet, members of Congress, and other influential leaders in the U.S. to the foreign policy
debates at any given time. In a democratic government, elites are both elected and appointed
(depending on the nature of pontification) to carry out the preferences of the majority public. The
elites are consequently accountable to the masses for their policies and its effectiveness
thereof. More often, the system of accountability from the elites to the masses is through
information from the news media as it shapes public opinion about foreign policy – in a large way.
This creates another relationship of dependency between the media and the elites as the elites are
also wary of the degree to which news media conveys their (elites) intentions and information to
the public. For example, in 2003, the Bush administration and members of Congress complained
that media bias was turning public opinion against the administration’s foreign policy on war
following the invasion of Iraq during the Persian Gulf War. Thus, buttressing (Brody and Shapiro
1989) that the extent of public support for a president’s foreign policy is dependent on the mix of
elite rhetoric about the president’s foreign policy for which citizens are exposed6.
Understanding Public opinion: Political Attitudes
In foreign policy matters, citizens come to hold opinions on, and become more responsive
to, what information is made available to them from political elites. Public opinion is the primary
driver behind the extensive and excessive counterterrorism efforts undertaken since 9/11, and
officials and elites are more nearly responding to public fear than creating it. The logic that “fear
sells” according to James Risen – an American foreign policy journalist – does not necessarily
mean that the fear would find a receptive audience. However, some political writings suggests that
fear is likely to be serviced by news media than countered if the fear of terrorism persists among
the public. Yet, he admits that the public is not as manipulable on salient issues7.
Political attitudes of the masses are an important factor in understanding public opinion.
What are attitudes and how do political attitudes affect public opinions on political
inquiries? Attitudes in this context refers to “an organized and consistent manner of thinking,
feeling, and reacting with regard to an event in one’s environment.” Therefore, during political
inquiries, attitudes are viewed as either existing, non-existent, or existing but easily
manipulated. This is because people’s thoughts about politics are generally disorganized,
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inconsistent, ambivalent, and/or ignorant.8 Early works on public opinion and its nature of
volatility and lack of coherent structure support these findings. They associate how the public
forms understanding of complex and distant events such as foreign policy initiatives with news
stereotypes – now commonly called frames of reference. They identify many of these news
stereotypes as being values that emerge from permanent characteristics of culture, such as election
cycles.910 Public opinion analysts are well abreast of the ideological inconsistencies in citizen’s
responses to different issues.11 In trying to measure public opinion on a myriad of issues, they have
consistently found that majority of the public have many different attitudes to both the same issues
and to different issues. For example, at the most intense period in the Gulf War, public opinion
vacillated greatly across the different questions used by different polling organizations trying to
measure the same attitude. Depending on how questions are framed, support for a difficult issue
can be as low as 40 percent to 50 percent or as go as high as 80 percent. 12 Moreover, sampling
problems such as selection biases and representativeness are important factors to consider when
measuring credibility of public opinion. The resultant effect of surveying uninformed masses on
their opinions of topics they have limited information, or little to no previous thoughts are rough
and superficial statements. In Zaller (1992), he employed four axioms for modelling the
relationship between information flow (news) and attitude changes on the public and discussed the
implications of his findings from public’s statements/opinion on political preferences.
Axiom 1: Reception Axiom: “The greater a person’s level of cognitive engagement with an issue,
the more likely he or she is to be exposed to and comprehend or receive political messages
concerning that issue.”13
Axiom 2: Resistance Axiom: “People tend to resist arguments that are inconsistent with their
political predispositions, but they do so only to the extent that they possess the contextual
information necessary to perceive a relationship between the message and their
predispositions.”14
Axiom 3: Accessibility Axiom: “The more recently a consideration has been called to mind or
thought about, the less time it takes to retrieve that consideration or related considerations from
memory and bring them to the top of the head for use.”15
Axiom 4: Response Axiom: “Individuals answer survey questions by averaging across the
considerations that are immediately salient or accessible to them.”16
The vacillating nature of reports on people’s political attitudes over time constitutes a
major source of concern for the empirical findings of modern survey research. If people are
exposed to a shifting balance between conservative and liberal news communications, the balance
of judgments or considerations in their mind consequently changes, bringing about systematic
attitude changes in their survey reports. On the other hand, if people are exposed to a steady flow
of news communications, the ambivalence in considerations for each given issue on each person’s
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mind will, on average, remain roughly consistent at any point in time. Possibly, the Response
Axiom (Axiom 4) provides the most explanation for this instability.
Another problem in trusting the authenticity of public opinion is a concept called
“response effects.” unrelated to the response axiom, Response Effects “refers to cases in which
seemingly irrelevant features of questionnaire design affect the responses given.”1718 This explains
that many respondents make up their responses on the survey as they confront each question. The
Accessibility Axiom (Axiom 3) may well explain this pattern as it implies that the more recently
a consideration or an idea has been called to mind, the more readily available it is for use in
answering questions. Nevertheless, not all people are affected by this effect. It is found that
unaffected people have judgments and considerations that are highly consistent in their support of
a side of an issue that the reception of additional considerations barely influences them.
Furthermore, the effects of “priming” on a sample population can affect political
significance of public opinion. Priming is described as a different but equally consequential
version of agenda setting, whereby media attends to some problems and ignores others.19 The
public takes their political information from the mass media (especially television programs), thus
giving them the insidious power to control what people think about. Experimental evidence
shows that news organizations have the capability to alter the public’s standard of evaluating
presidents through priming. If candidates for a particular political office are not taken seriously by
news organizations, they are most likely not going to be taken seriously by the public, leaving
some presidential candidates more advantaged than the others.20 Similarly, people’s evaluation of
a president will significantly affect their attitudes on – defense spending, for example – if they
have just watched a broadcast on defense spending than if they have not.21 2223 With priming, media
therefore alters the standards by which people evaluate a president’s general performance in
government, and this alteration is more possible among less-informed people (novices) than it is
among well-informed people (experts).24 Like the Accessibility Axiom 3, novices tend to be
overwhelmed with the imbibement of large amounts of new information while well-informed
citizens on politics can examine information more deeply and critically because their knowledge
of national problems is denser and better organized.
The nature of political attitude reports makes measuring public opinion in any way difficult
to defend as a neutral process. Nonetheless, the filtering procedures in sampling representation
17
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and the elimination of common sampling problems discussed above increases the political
significance of the public opinion and places a demand on political leaders to pay attention to the
public’s true feelings. From this analysis, we also find that values (e.g., individualism, limited
government, equality, moral traditionalism, etc.), and not merely ideologies (conservative or
liberal), best explain what shapes people’s political attitudes in a general way.25
The Relationship and Importance of Public Opinion to Foreign Policy
Baum and Potter (2008) argue that news media influences nearly all aspects of the
relationship between public opinion and foreign policy26. Therefore, any study that seeks to
synthesize the disparate literatures on the relationship between public opinion and foreign policy
must analytically incorporate public opinion, elite preferences, and mass media as unitary but
strategic actors each with their own incentives and preferences. The causes and consequences of
public support for foreign policies on war are continuing debates among scholars.2728 To
incorporate arguments from fifteen literatures, this interdependent relationship is best described
as: “media influence public opinion, public opinion influences the media, public opinion
influences decision makers, decision makers influence public opinion, decision makers influence
the media, foreign policy influences public opinion, decision makers influence events, and the
media influence foreign policy.”29 Following these underpinnings, understanding how the media
responds to market pressures is important to understanding the phenomenal process of foreign
policymaking.
Relationship Between Leaders, Public, and Media: Typically, demand for foreign policy
news might be low because of low public attention and information gap. However, the media plays
a mediating role between the citizens and the elites. Consequently, leaders are incentivized to be
involved in the flow of information that news media publish for citizens’ consumption.30 On the
other hand, the public’s reliance on the media for news information on foreign policy creates
an informational disadvantage as news becomes susceptible to “framing” by elites and through
news media. Framing refers to the “process by which a communication source such as a
news organization defines and construct a
political issue or public controversy.”31 Therefore,
news media (and elites) can shape public opinion in the way that they “frame” issues. An elitecentric perspective on public opinion believes that the public is barely informed
and indecisive about foreign policy issues and the vacillating nature of public opinion makes
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it unreliable.32 33 34 35 Entman (2003) characterized this elite-centric framing agenda as “culturally
congruent frames” – that is, frames congruent with patterns of behavior habitually employed by
most citizens.36 For example, when former President Bush post 9/11 identified Osama bin Laden
and the al Qaeda group as “evil doers,” such culturally congruent framing makes it difficult for the
media to challenge as the public’s informational disadvantage is made worse by the one-sided tone
in news coverage. On the other hand, when leaders are divided on a foreign policy issue, the
media can take advantage of the conflict and offer multiple frames on any given elite debate to
citizens.37 Through this, news media ameliorates the information gap between leaders and the
citizens, increasing the potential significance of public opinion on that foreign policy. Realist
theory of International Relations bases this elite-centric argument as a justification for limiting
foreign policy decision making to what constitutes national interest, rather than exploring
preferences and attitudes of the public.38 39 So, since an uninformed electorate cannot inform or
evaluate a president’s decisions, scholars have long expressed doubts on the masses’ ability to
process information or produce consistent opinions40 41, especially on foreign policy
issues.42 Alternatively, other scholars propose that although the masses may be at a significant
informational disadvantage, the public can remain informed and active in foreign policy
discussions (Aldrich et al. 1989, Destler 2001) if they intentionally seek information.43
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In contrast, public opinion on international events and policies can be significant to foreign
policy decision making.44 45 46 47 48 49 In fact, these studies prove a significant and closer connection
between public opinion and foreign policy choice (more than domestic policy areas).50
51
Moreover, revisionist studies contend against the elite-centric model and assert that public
opinion – when well conducted – has the potential to influence foreign policymaking.
Furthermore, event-based explanations are one way to understand the relationship
between, and importance of, public opinion and foreign policy. The event-based
explanations assert that a president’s ability to sustain public support for a foreign policy on war
highly depends on its degree of success,52 53 number,54 trend,55 rate,56 and framing,57 relative to
U.S. casualties. Jentleson (1992) argues that public opinion in America is likely going to favor
military actions perceived as imposing restraint on an adversary than it is to be in favor of military
actions aimed at imposing internal political change in an adversary state.58 59 The rally’-round-theflag phenomenon60 61 did not find significant evidence to this argument. Political observers have
44
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long noted that public perceptions concerning the offensive or defensive nature of military
engagements abroad are often visceral to the political circumstances surrounding citizens at
‘home’, including elites' rhetoric primarily intended for their own advantage.62 63 In the same vein,
presidents who lose public support for their foreign policy typically find it extremely difficult to
sustain the policy initiatives. As described in former President Bill Clinton’s 1997 document on
National Security Strategy: “one...consideration regarding the central role the American people
rightfully play in how the United States wield its power abroad: the United States cannot long
sustain a commitment without the support of the public.”64 Likewise, former President George W.
Bush’s in his foreign policy initiative during the Persian Gulf War corroborated this argument by
acknowledging that the “continued support of the American people... [is one of the six]
...conditions for victory” in the war.
Knecht and Weatherford (2006) counterargues that public’s attention and level of
information for foreign policy issues vary systematically across the issue areas (crises or noncrises) and a president only needs to pay attention to public attentiveness to both national and
foreign policy issues to know how to respond on foreign policy decision making.65 For the intents
of this review, crises issue areas are defined according to the International Crisis Behavior Project
(ICBP) as ‘‘a situation in which three conditions, deriving from a change in a state’s external or
internal environment, are perceived by the highest-level decision makers of the state: (a) a threat
to basic values, (b) an awareness of finite time for response, and (c) a high probability of
involvement in military hostilities.”66 Examples are the Cuban Missile Crisis/Bay of Pigs invasion
and the Gulf War. On the other hand, non-crisis issue areas refer to cases where the use of military
force as an option is highly unlikely and/or the time span to make a policy decision
alongside implementing the policy is comparatively long. Examples include foreign aid, nuclear
arms control, and international economic agreements. However, regarding public opinion, crises
and non-crisis issues areas are differentiated from one another based on the duration and intensity
of the public’s interest.67
As
alluded
above, the
media, alongside
the
public
and
its
leaders, strategically shapes public attitudes about political inquiries as well as shapes the
influence of public attitudes on foreign policy. Despite the outlying outcome of public opinion on
the Bush administration’s invasion of Iraq, most political science literature insists that news media
is a conveyor belt for messages from the elite to the public.68 The conflict in Iraq is considered an
outlier in this argument because every justification by the Bush administrations about the war
eventually exceeded the realities of casualties that Americans could generally be in favor of. The
consequences of the public’s disapproval reflected in the president’s rapidly low approval ratings
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and – perhaps the reason for – loss by his party in the 2006 midterm Congressional election. 69For
presidents, the salient part of political support is “approval rating.” presidents who can
maintain high approval ratings aim at such to gain leverage vis-a-vis Congress. It can further be
argued that presidents in democracies are interested in public opinion and reactions when making
foreign policy decisions because they are held accountable in election contexts.70 If the media
presents foreign policy initiatives as involving traditional military operations (forceful coercion of
an aggressive enemy adversary of the U.S. or its allies), the public will most likely support the
policy initiative even at a significant cost to the U.S. However, when the media conveys foreign
policy decisions involving aggressive military mission abroad (like humanitarian
interventions or efforts to depose tyrannical foreign leaders), the public will most likely support
only if the costs are kept low.71
In contrast, some scholars argue otherwise. They claim that the public will support a
military mission abroad regardless of casualties if it finds other countries supporting the policy
initiative.72 73 Feaver and Gelpi (2004) take a slight bent on this argument and assert that public
tolerance for casualties depends on the probability that the foreign policy initiative will be
successful.74 An emerging concern about this argument75 holds that public opinion is not as
uniform as the above studies infer.76 For example, in Gartner and Segura (1998, 2000)’s
evaluation of the implication of race on public opinion, they observed a disproportionate
correlation between the rate of casualties from respondent’s home region and political attitudes
towards the war. Yet, they find no evidence that racial composition of casualties can influence
political attitudes.
Other scholars discuss the importance of framing on the heterogeneity of public opinion as
well-informed individuals on politics are more resistant to elite framing than political novices.77
According to (Zaller 1992), he supports that the key to political awareness is consumption of
political communications in ways like media exposure, political participation, self-identified
interest in politics, and education. He defined political awareness as an “intellectual or
cognitive engagement with public affairs as against emotional or affective engagement or no
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engagement at all.”78 Indeed, public support for foreign missions tends to be precarious when it is
politically unaware of the initiative and therefore requires access to substantial information.
How News Media Affects Public Opinion – Media as a Strategic Actor: While the relationship
between leaders, citizens, and the media is an interdependent one, the media plays a strategic role.
It collects, frames, and distributes information (a salient market commodity) to the
masses. From the discussions above, it can be inferred that the influence of public opinion is
driven by a supply of and demand for information. That is, the influence of the public on foreign
policy initiatives seems low when it is informationally disadvantaged (typically at early stages of
conflicts abroad) and grows substantively in longer periods of conflicts as the information gap
blurs out.79 On the supply side, the media depends on leaders for access to information and under
that circumstance, can be compelled to preserve elites’ preferred framing of information. Since the
public are the consumers [of news information], news media is obliged to their demand for
“objective” news information.80 81 Partisan preferences as well as institutional and professional
preferences may influence the transmission processes in media coverage.82 As
the middleman between two competing actors (leaders and the public) whose interests often
conflict, the media delicately strives to balance their trade – maintain access to
government information by respecting elites’ interests and maintain public interests in the way
they communicate their reporting. In the study on the formation of public opinion, Entman (2003)
employs the “cascade model” to explain this strategic relationship. Although the government
interacts with the media which subsequently tells people what to believe and both actors then
receive feedback from the public, public attitudes are extremely volatile. With variations in such
cultural congruence, government strategy and power, the media-government relationship can
move from loyally communicating the administration’s message to being critical and even
spotlighting an opposing frame.83 Hence the most likely times that political leaders will manipulate
media messages communicated to the public seems more likely during times of national crisis.84
This contradicts studies that advocate that public opinion can/should be a salient part in
foreign
policymaking. Powlick and
Katz
(1998) addresses
that
public
opinion is inconsequential and public attention to foreign policies are low, thus contending that
this creates the flexibility for political leaders to decide on foreign policy as they deem
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appropriate.85 Yet, they warn that foreign policy outcomes can arouse public attention when news
media and expert commentators rather emphasize frames consistent with public interests what Entman (2003) refers to as “culturally congruent frames”. When this happens, the
government is compelled to rally for public support by engaging the public or else they lose their
ability to effectively manage public opinion on the foreign policy issue.86
Possibility of Bias in News Transmission: This paper has discussed news media as both a linkage
mechanism between elite and public, and as an independent, strategic actor in the foreign
policymaking process. Indeed, some scholars hold that media coverage comprises more of elite
rhetoric.87 Several non-political-science researchers, however, argue that news media holds more
potential than that to be a neutral arbiter. They claim that journalists decide on news content and
headlines based on their newsworthiness, demonstrating that media can alternatively publish
unrepresentative preferences of elite rhetoric.88 89 90 Whether biases may exist in certain types of
news coverage (from elite to the public), or this bias is increased with the proliferation of partisan
media outlets, research is inconclusive but still developing.
Conclusion
This paper focused on examining the relationship between public opinion and foreign
policy and how news media affects this relationship. Because this literature is centered on the
American context, this review primarily focused on the United States. This paper sought to
generate a clearer understanding of the way public opinions increases or reduces pressure on the
president to substantially consider the public – in addition to Congress and national advisers – in
its foreign policy making process. In as much as public opinion is important to foreign policy
decision making process in democracies, extra thought must be given to the effects of response
reliability both on the policy issues and on the president's approval ratings on the
issue. Respondents answer questions based on particular considerations most immediately salient
to them if they usually have no fixed attitude on the issues or are internally conflicted on the issues.
Thus, bringing about a certain degree of response instability over time. This study finds that
public opinion is highly ambivalent and more so, sustaining public support for a foreign
policy on war is extremely difficult.
News media is an important intermediary between the citizens and their elites, especially
regarding foreign policy. The supply of information is central when accounting for demand in
policies which consequently affects public attitudes of citizens. News media are partly responsible
for variance in difficulty level in public support for presidential foreign policy. Whether or not the
public will support a president’s foreign policy on war depends in part on the strategic preferences
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of the news media. Research on the possibility of bias in the way that news media sometimes
convey the intentions of policy makers is inferred but inconclusive.
From this review, public opinion influences foreign policy decision making - although to
varying degrees and sometimes indirectly – to the extent that leaders are continuously interested
in whether and how the public will react to their foreign policy initiatives both in the short and
long term. This study does not explore this relationship in autocracies, although there may be a
possibility that the findings in this paper have tremendous applications in the foreign policymaking
process in autocracies.
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